

**Multi-agency response capabilities and planning for
significant sporting events**

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Abstract

The 2012 London Olympics required complex and intricate emergency planning as an event bringing together people from around the globe. Events of this scale and nature require logistical considerations surrounding crisis response and evacuation. Large crowds generate opportunity for risk not only from an external threat, but also during those processes of evacuation put in place with the intention of protection. This case study will highlight the logistical and developmental needs of planning for risk in a global event, and the necessity of wider dissemination to all levels of those involved in the planning and day-to-day function during the duration of the Games. This forms the core of preparedness for crisis response, and can be transferred to apply to the necessity of detailed and thorough logistical planning for similar scenarios, such as the FIFA World Cup 2022, upcoming in the Qatar region.

Introduction

Mega-events over the past decade have represented a demand for emergency planning on an unprecedented scale. The scale, geographical location and diverse nature of these events present a need for detailed and quality assured systems of response in the instance of emergency or crisis. As mega-events typically draw a physical population from around the globe, as well as multi-million digital audience members, the high-profile positioning of the events in the media heighten the risk of terrorist activity or marauding threats during the events.

This case study will draw on evidence from the London 2012 Olympic Games to explore the importance of safety planning and emergency response systems in the mega-event sphere.

The relationship between sporting events, media coverage and risk has been explored at length, and can be explored further in Toohey's piece on 'Terrorism at the Olympics.'¹ It was clear that any response to emergency situations would need to take a seamless and structured approach, incorporating the capabilities and expertise across all Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) on a multi-agency platform. Stakeholders and organisers naturally form an important part of the planning

¹ Toohey, Kristine & Taylor, Tracy. (2008). Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terrorism at the Olympic Games. *Journal of Sport Management*. 22. 451-469. 10.1123/jsm.22.4.451.

process, reliant upon the specialist knowledge of SAGs to aid the smooth-running of their event.²

Contingency plans for safe evacuation were required by statute for each individual venue, alongside response plans that mitigated further risk following any threat/incident during the Games. The implementation of these plans was then quality assessed thoroughly across stakeholders, a necessary process to ensure mega-events have a consistently high-quality and meaningful planning and preparedness strategy, that tailors to the specific nature of locations and events.

Key learning points to be taken from the study are outlined below:

- To identify the requirement for detailed plans that go beyond the response of core services to incorporate logistical factors in event preparedness
- To identify best practice in preparedness for large-scale events
- To identify strategies for thorough and specific planning for a range of venues and scenarios
- To identify methods of establishing systems and protocols built on clearly defined responsibilities for individuals as well as agencies.

The Olympic Games

Inspired by the Games held in Ancient Rome, the Olympic Games in their modern format have existed since 1894, when the first ever Olympics took place in

² Becca Leopkey & Milena M. Parent (2009) Risk Management Issues in Large-scale Sporting Events: a Stakeholder Perspective, *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 9:2, 187-208, DOI: 10.1080/16184740802571443

Athens. With teams participating from over 200 nations, it is the definitive event on the global sport events calendar.³ There are 206 Olympic Committees, dedicated to the participation and promotion of their respective athletes at the Games, making the Olympics a defining event for the unifying of cultures, states and religions from across the globe.⁴

Whilst host countries have heightened security protocols during the Olympic Games, there have been incidents in which fatalities have occurred due to targeted attack on the event. The most famous of these took place at the 1972 Munich Olympics, where the Palestinian terrorist group 'Black September' captured and eventually massacred eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team.⁵ The terrorists are believed to have been motivated by the sizeable media coverage their attack would receive, and the event has become one of the most famous hostage situations in history.⁶

Smaller scale attacks have also taken place, such as the pipe-bomb detonation at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics which killed one person immediately and injured over a hundred more.⁷ In the Beijing 2008 Olympics a marauding knife attack

³ John R. Short (2008) Globalization, cities and the Summer Olympics, *City*, 12:3, 321-340, DOI: [10.1080/13604810802478888](https://doi.org/10.1080/13604810802478888)

⁴ International Olympic Committee, *National Olympic Committees*, [online], <https://www.olympic.org/national-olympic-committees?q=ProtocolOrderFilter> ACCESSED 6/4/2020

⁵ Stefan. M. Aubrey (2004) *'The New Dimension of International Terrorism'* Vdf Hochschulverl. an der ETH Zürich P.34

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Gross, Doug (April 14, 2005). "Eric Rudolph Lays Out the Arguments that Fueled His Two-Year Bomb Attacks". *San Diego Union-Tribune*. Associated Press.

killed two American spectators, and the Chinese authorities claimed to have foiled several suspected terrorist plans to attack the Games.⁸

Perhaps the greatest indicator that the 2012 Olympic Games would require emergency planning and preparedness on an unprecedented scale came in the form of the 7/7 2005 London terrorist attacks. The coordinated explosions took place across London, three detonating on the underground, and one explosive detonating on a double-decker bus. The impact was 52 fatalities, with hundreds more injured, making the event the single worst terrorist atrocity on British soil.⁹ The attacks, which took place one day after London had been declared the venue for the 2012 Olympic Games seemed to highlight the vulnerability and risk of crowded transport in a fast-paced city. The bombings were carried out by four individuals and showed the world the risk posed by marauding terrorist activity, a threat which has gone on to define much of the emergency planning for mass gatherings and large-scale events. The event also highlighted the importance of coordination between emergency response agencies, and the need for emergency planning that covers everyday scenarios.

It is clear therefore that, whilst the London 2012 Olympic Games represented a global celebration of sport and competition, they inherently carried a greater risk of incidents for the host country.¹⁰ The mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of

⁸ CNN News, 'China says 35 arrested in Olympics bomb plot', [online], <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/04/10/olympic.plot/> ACCESSED 6/4/2020

⁹ BBC News, '7 July Bombings: What happened that day?' <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33253598> ACCESSED 14/4/20

¹⁰ Houlihan, B. and Giulianotti, R. (2012), Politics and the London 2012 Olympics: the (in)security Games. *International Affairs*, 88: 701-717. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01097.x

spectators and world-class athletes, accompanied by huge media coverage generated an environment whereby planning and preparedness is not only necessary, but a legal requirement. This case study explores the systems and plans put in place by SAGs to cater for this 'Olympic Difference' to ensure safety of participants and spectators was central to the running of the Games. All planning and guidance were produced with an understanding that the scale and nature of the Olympic Games created unique and unprecedented needs for thorough security planning¹¹. This 'Olympic Difference' includes challenges of bringing together citizens from across the globe, creating spectator sites fit for purpose that also meet highest preparedness standards, and communications that are efficient, but far-reaching across agencies in the case of an incident. This concept was the core understanding of the demands for planning and formed the centre of gap analysis in what emergency response systems existed, and what needed further development. The core methods and values implemented demonstrate universal objectives and accomplishments for preparedness planning, which should be transferable to any large-scale sporting event across the globe. For a more in-depth analysis of 'Olympic Difference' see Appendix 1.

Key objectives

The main intent and aim behind the implementation of contingency plans was clearly to ensure the safety of participants and spectators during mega events. These were broken down into clear and specific objectives within the multi-agency

¹¹ Olympic and Paralympic Policing Coordination Team, (June 2011), *Multi Agency Guidance for the Development of Contingency and Emergency Plans For Olympic and Paralympic Venues and Event* P.9

guidance generated specifically for the event by the Olympic and Paralympic Policing Coordination Team.¹²

The core values of emergency planning and preparedness are outlined by the Home Office in the document *London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security*.¹³ Figure 1 explains the values and layers of preparation has been taken from this document to highlight the core of the work that took place for the 2012 London Olympics.




Figure 1: The core values and strategies for security and safety in the 2012 Olympic Games
 Source: *London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security*

¹² *Ibid.* P.5

¹³ Home Office, (March 2011) *London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy*, P. 14

These objectives addressed the need for all agencies to hold sufficient information and support to enable fluid and cooperative response systems and plans.¹⁴ This concept underpinned the entire project and necessitated the development of plans and practice that saw all emergency responder agencies work collaboratively to provide expertise, specialist equipment and resources that resulted in high quality emergency plans. This collaboration was integral to all stages of the Olympic planning; from SAG consultations in formulating plans, to allocating staff and resources in plans for emergency scenarios. These plans were intentionally broad in nature, from the death of an athlete, a deliberate violent attack or incidents such as fire and flooding. Each venue and event developed numerous plans ranging from the logistical running of the games, to contingency and preparedness plans in case of emergency circumstances. The several layers/types of plans developed can be seen in Figure 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Venue Plans	Routine operation of the venue and the associated infrastructure. Usually a multi-agency document but overall responsibility lies with the event organiser
Event Plans	Plans for the routine delivery of an event including any specialist requirements. Should usually be collaborative.
Operational Plans	A specific breakdown of highly detailed plans external agencies will hold during an event. These usually come later in the multi-agency planning stage as they set out how each agency sits in the bigger picture of planning for that venue/event.
Contingency Plans	A plan for the multi-agency response to incidents. These are the plans that aim to mitigate risk to the public in the instance of a security threat, that is not an emergency scenario. This category usually includes evacuation plans.
Emergency Plans	An agreed multi-agency plan for responding to emergency scenarios through the values of: identify, prevent, pre-empt, disrupt and mitigate risk. These plans must be interoperable with all other plan types.

Figure 2 - The Types of Plans required for the Olympic Games. Outlined by the Head of Emergency Planning for the Metropolitan Police during the 2012 London Olympics.

Source: Author

Another central objective to the success of the contingency planning was that which fed into concepts of best practice, quality assurance and consistency when facing

the ‘Olympic Difference.’¹⁵ Whilst this term specifically references the Olympics, it in fact can be applied to many global mega-events, or mass gatherings. Stakeholders identified that systems would need to be specific to each venue, but built upon common thorough processes around planning and rigorous testing in order to ensure all events/venues had developed and put in place high-quality emergency plans. An example of the quality assurance system put in place is evidenced in Figure 3, showing the process by which plans received multiple review points at local and then wider level.




Figure 3 - Sign-off process for quality assurance as outlined by Head of Preparedness for London 2012 Games

Source: Author

As evidenced by the materials produced by those planning responses, this project was very much aiming to go beyond just high-quality planning. The agencies used this planning to not only develop best practices for future events, but also to produce templates and structures with proven success for wider dissemination. This ongoing process of development is integral in planning for sports events, whereby

¹⁵ Olympic and Paralympic Policing Coordination Team, (June 2011), *Multi Agency Guidance for the Development of Contingency and Emergency Plans For Olympic and Paralympic Venues and Event*, P 12-13

effective implementation at one event can be used to develop the security of another, in effect producing a holistic approach to security planning for all events and venues.

A key lesson learned from this case study for future mega-events is the importance of making plans accessible and clear for all stakeholders. This should include everyone from those formulating the strategies to those implementing them on the ground. Future sporting events can build upon the system of learning and growth, as well as the planning implemented to develop thorough and long-lasting response plans.

Key agencies and stakeholders

The emergency planning for the London 2012 Olympic Games required input and expertise that went beyond that of the core emergency services. It is known that policing for the event was at a level above that of routine levels within London, and that greater focus was placed on the emergency response agencies for the duration of the games.¹⁶ The Police, Fire and Ambulance services were the primary agencies involved in both the emergency response protocols, and the establishment of a coordinated response to an array of potential incidents. Whilst those services formed an integral part of the planning process, the scope of expertise extended to the NHS, transport services, and the Environment Agency, amongst countless others. The SAGs required on-site at venues for the on-the-ground emergency response strategy

¹⁶ Armstrong, G., Giulianotti, R., Hobbs, D. (2017). Policing the 2012 London Olympics. London: Routledge, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315795270>

is outlined in Figure 4, outlined by the Head of Emergency planning for the Metropolitan Police during the 2012 Olympics.



Figure 4: Minimum SAG requirement for each Olympic Venue

Source:

Olympic and Paralympic Policing Coordination Team, (June 2011), Multi Agency Guidance for the Development of Contingency and Emergency Plans For Olympic and Paralympic Venues and Event

There were of course, dedicated Olympic planning bodies such as LOGOC (London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games) and NOCC (National Olympic Co-ordination Centre) which had the sole purpose of organising a safe and successful Olympic Games. These organisations played an important role in the allocation, coordination and organisation of individuals from relevant agencies, and collated expertise and knowledge from those agencies to

inform their actions.¹⁷ This model is used in many mega-events, as specialist sporting organisations hold the greatest specialist knowledge around the demands and nature of their own specific event.

Various British Government agencies also formed a significant proportion of those involved in the Olympic 2012 planning and preparedness; ranging from Local Authorities and The London Mayor's Office, all the way to input and regulation from the Home Office. The government of England had a huge stake in the success of the Games, not only in terms of protecting human life, but also in political reputation and international image. The host country is often subjected to great media coverage and scrutiny, and the impact of this coverage can have a very real effect on the international reputation of that nation.¹⁸

To give an idea of the range and number of agencies and stakeholders in the bigger picture of planning, refer to Appendix 2. This document shows those in attendance at a meeting of the London Resilience Group in April 2012, and it can be observed that the agencies in attendance come from backgrounds that are broad in spectrum, yet all relevant and valuable to the planning stages of the 2012 Olympic Games.

Co-operation and interoperability

A multi-agency system is one that is formulated, implemented and tested by multiple agencies through cooperative methods. This draws on and combines

¹⁷ Cabinet Office, *Olympic and Paralympic Games London 2012 Strategic Command*, PPT used for education session, Emergency Planning College

¹⁸ Chris Gratton & Holger Preuss (2008) Maximizing Olympic Impacts by Building Up Legacies, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 25:14, 1922-1938, DOI: 10.1080/09523360802439023

expertise from multiple sources to create response systems that are coordinated, efficient and quality-assured from multiple perspectives. The need for co-operation between responder agencies has formed the core of legislation on emergency planning in the UK, evident in the 2012 revision of the CCA (Civil Contingencies Act), which dedicated entire documents to the importance of these functions.¹⁹ This has meant that co-operation and collaboration between emergency response agencies has become not only standard practice in event organisation but also entrenched into the culture of security and preparedness in the UK.

Interoperability is the ability for these plans to operate on a logistical level and is defined by JESIP (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme) as:

'the extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of routine'.²⁰

The focus of interoperability is on those critical stages of response to an incident, whereby both responder agencies and supporting agencies are able to effectively communicate and interact in order to mitigate risk. For example, in the event of a marauding terrorist attack inside a stadium the responding agencies would all need to operate collaboratively at the scene; the police would need to manage the incident, armed police would protect responders and pursue suspects. The fire brigade may need to assist in access for other agencies in environments such as

¹⁹ Cabinet Office, (March 2012), *CCA Civil Contingencies Act Chapter 2 Co-operation Revision to Emergency Preparedness*

²⁰JESIP, Edition 2, July 2016 <https://www.jesip.org.uk/uploads/resources/JESIP-Joint-Doctrine.pdf> P.2
ACCESSED 14/4/20

smoke-filled environments or wreckage. The ambulance service would need to treat casualties and evacuate those needing further treatment. All of this action would be happening concurrently, and relies on co-ordination and communication between agencies, based on interoperable platforms.

These values were the at the heart of the mega-event planning, and are becoming increasingly standardised practice on the events platform. For the purpose of learning objectives, this case study will focus on specific examples of good practices implemented during the 2012 Olympic Games.

As set out in Appendix 2, the scope of co-operation for emergency planning was extremely vast. Bronze Commanders from emergency services were present at meetings of Government, Olympic Bodies and SAG organisations to ensure transparent, coordinated and '*ongoing dialogue across agencies*'.²¹ These meetings were integral for sharing information across stakeholder groups and the information would be collated and streamlined to form the overall emergency plans and evacuation processes for the Olympic venues.²²

²¹ Metropolitan Police Seconded to London Resilience Group, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20* & Emergency Planning Lead in Construction/Destruction, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

²² Metropolitan Police Seconded to London Resilience Group, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

Communication between agencies during the 2012 Olympic Games

One aspect highly valued by commanders was the use of daily status reports sent to all agencies involved in planning, and the running of the events. These updates on the status of ongoing incidents, contextual circumstances and planning action/updates were sent to commanders three times a day to keep all agencies informed of the status of emergency planning teams.²³ This digital document created an efficient method of dissemination, and of dialogue across agencies, described by one commander as highly effective due to its 'flat' nature.²⁴ The simplicity of the document, alongside the frequency of updates and the multi-agency information sharing, enabled commanders to feel confident and informed in making decisions and running the events on a day-to-day basis. This very simple method of interoperability established communication platforms that could be easily accessed by all, and therefore helped uphold wider interoperability objectives in responding to events. This system proved to be so valuable, that agencies such as the Metropolitan Police continued in this practice after the 2012 Olympic Games had ended.

Tiered responsibilities to make roles clear for all Commanders and experiences

One of the most important elements of the emergency response planning was in the clearly defined tiering structure for all commanders and event staff. Mega-events have used this structure as a means of organising their planning and

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

implementation processes. Commanders are sorted into Bronze, Silver and Gold bands, with each carrying different responsibilities and expectations. Figure 5 below outlines the primary responsibilities of each commander level and the nature of where they fit into the bigger picture of planning.




Figure 5: Outline of Commander Tiers taken from a training document used to prepare for the games
 Source: Cabinet Office

This tiered system of commander responsibility was not created for the Olympics, but was an existing structure within emergency responder agencies, and as such had been ‘tried and tested’ at mega-events prior to the London 2012 Games. What became immediately apparent to those involved was the need to ‘scale-up’ the commander system when utilising it for mega-events, as well as the greater challenge in identifying specific roles and responsibilities at each level.²⁵ With a far greater-than-usual range of scenarios, venues and stakeholder agencies,

²⁵ Emergency Planning Lead in Construction/Destruction, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, Interviewed 9/4/20

any blurring of roles could undermine all emergency planning by creating confusion in the face of an incident.

To give an example of what this system looked like in practice during the 2012 Olympic Games, we can use the experience of Bronze Commander, Head of Emergency Planning for the Metropolitan Police. Chris Allison held the role of National Olympic Security Coordinator, overseeing the emergency planning for all events and venues. Reporting into him for each venue, including the Olympic Park, was a Gold Commander who oversaw venue-specific preparations. Beneath them were two Silver Commanders to assist in the management and direction of planning at the venue. They also oversaw 28 Bronze Commanders at the Olympic Park, from a range of agencies and backgrounds.²⁶ This system pre-existed the games and was described as '*tried and tested*' by the secondee to the London Resilience group from the Metropolitan Police.²⁷ It is the standard structure of command across all events in the UK, although the scale may differ. For example, the number of Bronze commanders may vary from 2-30 depending on factors such as the crowd size, nature of the event or layout of the venue.

The 28 Bronze Commanders held specific mandates to focus on relevant areas for planning, ranging from firearms specialists to construction of safe environments.²⁸ The specialist nature of Bronze Commanders links back to the

²⁶ Head of Emergency Planning for Metropolitan Police, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 8/4/20*

²⁷ Metropolitan Police Secondee to London Resilience Group, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

overarching principle of the ‘Olympic Difference.’ As the concept of the ‘Olympic Difference’ had identified a greater range and scale of emergency planning needs, the tiered system was able to reflect this by feeding specialist knowledge up to those at Gold level, who were ‘defining the strategy’.²⁹ Figure 6 sets out the structure of command at each Olympic Venue.




Figure 6: The management command structure for each Olympic Venue.
 Source: Incident Log report template used for 2012 Olympic games

Whilst the tiered system was a tried and tested process, it was not without challenge when applied to the Olympic Games. Another Bronze Commander (the lead on construction/destruction at the Olympic Park for Metropolitan Police) involved in the preparations for the 2012 London Olympics felt that the initial ‘*bonfire*’ of establishing the roles and responsibilities was impacted by agency ambition and some aspects of competition for desirable status within the planning.³⁰ Whilst this may appear problematic, the commander felt the strong ‘*management and action of his managers*’ and Silver/Gold Commanders enabled a quick and effective transition whereby each agency and tier level had clear outlines in respect of purpose and

³⁰Emergency Planning Lead in Construction/Destruction, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, Interviewed 9/4/20

powers.³¹ The key takeaway here is to identify that, whilst many may seek control of aspects of planning to improve their own status, the overall responsibility needs to lie with the *'best person for the job'* whereby the most relevant experience, and up-to-date intelligence can be applied.³²

A specific example of the need for specialist input from Bronze Commanders is best illustrated by an anecdote given about the hockey events planning. LOCOG, in constructing the spectator seating area, deviated from plans put forward by the specialist emergency service commanders.³³ They had been using their knowledge as event organisers to construct a scaffold best suited to spectator needs, but this did not incorporate the emergency planning protocols. By deviating from the approved and quality-assured plan, *'the entire structure was deemed void and had to be reconstructed, with only a few weeks' time'* to achieve completion.³⁴ Whilst the venue was ultimately completed successfully in time, it added an unnecessary burden of deconstruction, and urgent construction that generated stress and frustration for the agencies involved. What is evidenced in this example is the value of the tiered structure with specialists at all levels of command, as we can see that, once this structure was undermined or overridden, there was disruption and error in preparations.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*




Figure 7: An overview of the tiered system and how it fed into the bigger picture of emergency planning. Specialist knowledge is applied at Bronze level, which feeds up to inform national strategy at Gold, thus creating an ongoing process of EP learning.

Source: Author

Closely linked to this, from interviews with commanders, was the impression that the success of the tiered system came from the practice of identifying relevant experience and expertise when allocating commander roles.³⁵ This can be seen in Figure 7, which shows how each tier was used to form emergency plans. This illustrates a two-way relationship; highlighting the dissemination of information was not simply a top-down management structure, but rather a fluid and organic relationship between tiers. Those used at Bronze level were typically from professional backgrounds in emergency planning, with an understanding of the intricate demands for planning and preparation. This enabled those in post to swiftly move into position, contributing valuable expertise and support from the earliest stages of planning.³⁶

³⁵ Head of Emergency Planning for Metropolitan Police, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 8/4/20*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

As well as fitting that *'best person for the job'* strategy, this came with other benefits in terms of familiarisation.³⁷ Commanders found that they were typically liaising and collaborating with individuals that they would ordinarily work with frequently in their 'day job' before the Olympic Games.³⁸ For example, commanders from emergency planning within the Metropolitan Police had existing relationships with their counterparts in the Fire Service. This familiarity streamlined the process of planning, as most individuals were working in collaborative relationships that were both familiar and successful prior to the Olympic Games.³⁹ Relationships with social familiarity, or personal connections have been shown to significantly enhance the performance of groups.⁴⁰ One interviewee described this process as *'a scale up of existing structures and relationships. It worked really, really well.'*⁴¹ In summary, the tiered commander approach was proven to be highly effective in preparation for the Olympic Games, and therefore is now the assumed system of practice for mega-events within the UK.⁴² Recommendations on implementing this system for Qatar will follow in the recommendation section.

Outcomes and recommendations for Qatar

The London 2012 Olympic Games saw an unprecedented level of emergency planning and multi-agency co-operation. Several key strengths can be identified in

³⁷ Metropolitan Police Seconded to London Resilience Group, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Shah, P.P., Jehn, K.A. Do friends perform better than acquaintances? the interaction of friendship, conflict, and task. *Group Decis Negot* 2, 149–165 (1993). <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01884769>

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Emergency Planning Lead in Construction/Destruction, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

the process and would be valuable as good practice for Qatar in their preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

1. Testing and quality assurance

Testing is arguably the most important aspect of emergency planning. Systems that have been developed on best practice in theory, may not necessarily translate into practical functionality 'on the ground.' Rigorous testing is crucial for gap analysis of capabilities versus needs, and also allows individuals to be rehearsed and prepared for their role in the plan. All commanders interviewed specifically mentioned testing as a great strength of the 2012 London Olympics.

The testing exercises at every venue were thorough and simulated a range of possible incident situations. The strength of the testing came from the inclusivity of those involved in training and preparation tests. Commanders felt that the presence of staff all the way down to venue logistics (for example stewards/steward coordinators) meant that all levels of the response team were well-prepared and briefed.

*'Testing involved so many people; we made sure that steward coordinators and venue staff were involved so that everybody would be prepared and ready to follow procedure if there was a need to.'*⁴³

For another commander, the frequency of testing was key to preparedness, and through this testing those involved were able to gain familiarity and confidence in the quality of systems. It also quality assured the protocols in place

⁴³ Head of Emergency Planning for Metropolitan Police, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, Interviewed 8/4/20

and identified areas for improvement; ‘...*tested in specific exercises to ensure it was fit for purpose.*’⁴⁴

Testing was also invaluable in identifying ‘*best man for the job*’ approaches to responsibilities of agencies, and gaps in knowledge for putting plans into practice effectively.⁴⁵ The sign-off process indicated in Figure 3 also shows that, by being subject to multiple stages of review and scrutiny, plans received quality assurance from a range of expert sources.

Application for Qatar:

Qatar would benefit from liaising with those that oversaw testing exercises and implementing a regular and consistent programme of incident simulation for staff at all levels. In doing so, the FIFA 2022 World Cup can then help establish durable quality assurance systems that can be continued beyond the event itself. This will enable future events in Qatar, of all sizes, to have efficient and tested systems of response in place. Over time, familiarity with emergency planning will become entrenched into Qatar’s responder agencies, and it can become an area of ongoing growth and development. Qatar can then position themselves as the leading experts in event coordination for the MENA region.

2. Co-operation between agencies

The UK had legislation and established systems in place which had already developed multi-agency response systems and co-operation.

Application for Qatar

⁴⁴ Metropolitan Police Seconded to London Resilience Group, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

⁴⁵ Emergency Planning Lead in Construction/Destruction, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

In Qatar, where this is less entrenched and practised, refining this system is going to be pivotal for the security of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Specialist knowledge needs to be gathered from a range of sources, and then put into plans in a process that is overseen by a cooperative board of agencies. What may be of value for Qatar is the concept of an agency that oversees the entire process, but does not dictate or dismiss the input of other agencies when formulating plans and procedure. For the Olympic Games, and wider emergency planning in the UK '*this tends to be the Police force*', as they are first incident responders on the scene, and as they encounter the greatest range of incidents.⁴⁶ The lead agency would ideally be the police force for the reasons outlined previously, and they could coordinate the collaborative effort of other agencies and stakeholders. By doing so they are driving progress and giving direction to efforts, but also involving and incorporating the expertise of other agencies too. This will minimise competitive tension between agencies fighting for the 'top spot', and encourage co-operation to maximise the quality of planning.

3. Clear and efficient communications

The quality and '*flatness*' of communications was key to the success of the Olympic Games.⁴⁷ This means that individuals from agencies are able to 'reach back' into their own organisations to relay and receive information via as few channels as possible. By keeping channels of communication clear, concise and far-reaching, agencies were not only able to showcase interoperability, but to

⁴⁶ Head of Emergency Planning for Metropolitan Police, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 8/4/20*

⁴⁷ Emergency Planning Lead in Construction/Destruction, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

continually develop their day-to-day practice by responding to live information and communications. An excellent example of this given by a commander relates to an incident on the London Underground during the Olympic Games. This anecdote is outlined below:

*'During a very hot day of the Games, a fire on the Central tube line was reported in. The public and media picked this up, and began to respond to the fire by calling the fire service. In actuality a sensor had been triggered by hot brakes, and there was no fire taking place. The Fire Brigade began to respond to the calls, and in turn their engines began to disrupt traffic, which had an impact around Olympic venues. However, thanks to communications between our commanders, very quickly individuals were able to 'reach back' into their agency to clarify the situation. The fire trucks were dismissed very quickly, and the disruption was therefore minimal in the bigger picture. The communication streamline from individual to the heart of organisations was key for this de-escalation.'*⁴⁸

Application for Qatar

Qatar should implement similar systems of communication that are streamlined and 'flat'. This rapid and clear communication can then be disseminated via methods such as the daily updates mentioned previously to allow clear understanding and interoperability. Another key learning point is to test not only emergency plans, but also the channels of communication. Identifying a 'best fit' platform that facilitates interoperability is an excellent foundation, but testing its capability at an incident will ensure fast and co-ordinated responses.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

4. Engaging with spectators

This case study has predominantly focused on the interactions between agencies that developed effective plans and preparedness regarding the safety of spectators. However, those involved in the planning and running of the event have emphasised the role in which the interaction with spectators themselves can play in ensuring a safe Games take place. 'The Last Mile' was a term used to refer to the area in which fans queue for entry to an Olympic venue or event. By engaging with fans in this final stage of their Olympic journey, it is possible to not only identify potential threats through individuals acting suspiciously, but to also influence the tone and mood of the event.⁴⁹ It has been established that the perceptions of the spectators regarding security during the events can have a direct impact on the success of security systems.⁵⁰

Application for Qatar

Engaging with the crowd through conversation and positive interaction is important for producing an atmosphere of mutual respect and co-operation, which in the event of an incident could mitigate risk through seamless direction from authorities. This is perhaps even more important for the 2022 FIFA World Cup; football teams with long-lasting rivalries, the intensity of two-team sports, and the general behaviour widely associated with football matches all indicate an elevated risk of incidents caused by crowd interactions. If authorities can mitigate this through

⁴⁹ Metropolitan Police Seconded to London Resilience Group, Bronze Commander London 2012 Olympics, *Interviewed 9/4/20*

⁵⁰ George, Richard & Mawby, R.. (2013). Security at the 2012 London Olympics: Spectators' perceptions of London as a safe city. *Security Journal*. 28. 93-104. 10.1057/sj.2013.37.

establishing positive relationships and respect with spectators, the likelihood of resistance to regulations could be lessened.

The overall lessons to be learned from the 2012 London Olympic planning all come back to fundamental concepts; efficiency, testing, communication and co-operation. These strengths can be summarised as the definitive core of the Olympic planning process as follows:

Efficiency: Systems were kept clear and simple. This allowed communications and consequent action to happen rapidly between agencies.

Testing: Thorough and frequent testing ensured a range of scenarios had been practised, and response teams were confident in their roles

Communication: Agencies had standardised platforms of frequent communication. Communication between individuals and their own agency allowed fast action and response to live situations.

Co-operation: Agencies were all valued for their expertise and contributions. Whilst they were lead organisations, the process of developing plans was collaborative, with constant co-operation.

The greatest strength of the emergency planning practised was the information pooled and disseminated from all reaches of stakeholders and emergency agencies. Training and exercises were inclusive, thorough and seen as an opportunity for learning, as opposed to a test of 'does it work?' The challenge for Qatari agencies is to achieve a balance of responsibilities, co-operation and

interoperability that will allow a coherent and effective emergency response system, not just for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, but for informing future good practice.

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Teaching notes

Objectives:

- To identify the requirement for detailed plans that go beyond the response of core services to incorporate logistical factors in event preparedness
- To discuss best practice in preparedness for large-scale events
- To identify strategies for thorough and specific planning for a range of venues and scenarios
- To demonstrate methods of establishing systems and protocols built on clearly defined responsibilities for individuals as well as agencies.

Overview of Case Study:

This case study provides a specific example of how interoperability, tiered responsibility and emergency planning was carried out for the London 2012 Olympics. By following core principles of co-operation, efficiency, communication and testing, best practice for sporting event preparedness can be identified and utilised by event organisers and the industry as a whole.

Example Questions:

- 1. Identify the logistical implications for planning and preparedness in relation to large scale events such as the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar**

Venue: capacity needs to be big enough, evacuation plans need to specifically cater for the scale of the crowd and the layout of any temporary structures. The balance between suiting spectator/event organiser desirability, yet still meeting required safety needs (see LOCOG hockey example)

Transport: Accessibility to the venues, is there capacity in existing transport systems? How is increased usage of transport going to be managed? What are implications of access to stadiums?

2. Explain what interoperability means, and why it is important in preparing for sporting events.

Common platforms, practices and systems that are in place across agencies, allowing them to operate collaboratively. JESIP states this should be the ability of agencies to work together on a routine basis, not just in specifically defined instances. It is vital for sporting events whereby threats can come in a variety of forms, that require action from all emergency response agencies. They need to be able to operate in venues as scenes of emergency, without hindering the vital work each agency is carrying out.

3. Explain how the tiered Commander structure enabled specialist knowledge to be built into the planning procedure

Specialised Bronze Commanders were able to focus in on very specific areas of planning according to their expertise. This knowledge was fed up to Silver and Gold commanders, who could then pull together the 'bigger picture' for that venue. As Bronze commanders were able to 'hone in' on specific areas, this meant that detailed planning encompassed a range of specialist knowledge and considerations.

4. Explain the importance of the testing in ensuring contingency planning is thorough and how this could be applied effectively in Qatar

Testing: identified gaps in provision. 'Capability Vs Need' analysis meant the plans could be continually refined until a suitable level of provision. It also identified 'best man for the job' in some scenarios to allocate responsibilities and roles. It also created confidence and familiarity for all relevant individuals through rehearsal and simulation of potential incidents.

Application for Qatar: Testing needs to be frequent and involve all key agencies/individuals relevant for that venue. This could be led by one agency, probably the police, but ultimately is to be a collaborative process.

5. What challenges identified in the case study are reflected in planning for the World Cup 2022? Explain what mitigation was employed and how this could be applied to Qatar?

Co-operation: This is less entrenched in Qatari culture and is the key to success for planning events of all scales. Competition between agencies may generate a struggle for control and input, but this can be mitigated by having a lead agency that directs and coordinates the expertise of others.

Communications: Finding a platform that is accessible and operable for all agencies. Communications should be clear, simple structures that enable communication between agencies, but also from individuals back into the centre of their own organisations. The systems should be able to respond to live data/updates, and should be frequently disseminated to keep all parties informed of the latest scenario.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Factors contributing to the 'Olympic Difference'. Outline by Head Of Emergency Preparedness London 2012 Olympics, Metropolitan Police



Appendix 2: Minutes from London Local Resilience Forum as evidence of the extent of multi-agency planning

Meeting	London Local Resilience Forum
Date	Monday 16 April 2012
Time	10.00 am
Place	Committee Room 5, City Hall

Chair: Richard Barnes AM, Deputy Mayor of London

Attending (in alphabetical order of organisation):

Don Randall, Head of Security, Bank of England (Business Sector Panel)

Steve Thomas, Assistant Chief Constable, British Transport Police

Adrian Leppard, Commissioner, City of London Police

James Cruddas, Head of Resilience and Emergencies Division, Department for Communities and Local Government

Howard Davidson, Director South East, Environment Agency

Mark Beveridge, Strategic Emergency Preparedness Manager, Health Protection Agency

Richard Webber, Director of Operations, London Ambulance Service

John O'Brien, Chief Executive, London Councils (Local Authorities Sector Panel)

Col Hugh Bodington, Chief of Staff, London District (Military)

Ron Dobson, Commissioner, London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Andrew Pritchard, Head of Emergency Planning, London Fire Brigade

Sir Ian Johnston, Director of Security and Resilience, London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games

Richard Jones, Head of Network Operations and Control, London Underground

Mark Rogers, Met Office Advisor (Civil Contingencies), Met Office

Mark Rowley, Assistant Commissioner for Central Operations, Metropolitan Police Service

Chris Webb, Deputy Director of Public Affairs, MPS (Comms Sector Panel)

Simon Tanner, Regional Director of Public Health, NHS London

Chris Featherstone, Thames Water

Seamus Kelly, St John Ambulance (Voluntary Sector Panel)

Mike Weston, Operations Director, Transport for London

Nigel Furlong, Head of Resilience Planning, Transport for London (Transport Sector Panel)

Greater London Authority officers:

Neale Coleman, Director of London 2012 Coordination

Tom Middleton, Head of Performance and Governance

Hamish Cameron, London Resilience Manager

Matthew Hogan, London Resilience Officer

Dale Langford, Senior Committee Officer

- 1.2 Apologies had been received from Ven Dr Paul Wright, Faith Sector Panel; Chris Duffield, Town Clerk and Chief Executive, City of London Corporation (Deputy Chair); Peter Guy, Operational Security & Continuity Planning Manager, Network Rail; and Doug Turner, Utilities Sector Panel.